Relative efficiency within a tax administration: The effects of result improvement by Villar Rubio, Elena et al.
135
Relative efficiency within a tax 
administration: The effects of 
result improvement*1
ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the Spanish tax administration, evaluating the 
relative efficiency of each of the regional offices that are its constituent parts 
via output-oriented two-stage data envelopment analysis. In the study, a total 
of 47 regional offices were analysed, considering three inputs: 1) current ex-
penditure in goods and services; 2) number of tax returns processed in terms 
of the two main direct taxes; and, 3) personnel numbers. Revenue resulting 
from tax assessments was considered as output. The analysis shows that the 
efficient action of regional offices might have increased by 21.6% the results 
of the management of this administration.
Keywords: Tax Administration Agency, technical efficiency, data en-
velopment analysis, tax revenue.
JEL: H21, H83
Eficiencia	relativa	en	una	administración	tributaria:	 
Efectos de una mejora en sus resultados
RESUMEN
A través de este trabajo se ha abordado el análisis de la administración 
tributaria española mediante la evaluación de la eficiencia relativa de cada 
una de las oficinas territoriales que la integran, empleando para ello el análisis 
envolvente de datos de forma bietápica, con una orientación output. En el 
estudio se han analizado 47 oficinas territoriales, considerando tres inputs: 1) 
los gastos corrientes en bienes y servicios; 2) el número de declaraciones ges-
tionadas por los dos principales impuestos directos; y 3) el número de efectivos 
que presta sus servicios. Como output los Ingresos por Actos de Liquidación. 
El análisis pone de manifiesto que una actuación eficiente de las oficinas te-
rritoriales podría haber incrementado un 21.6% los resultados de la gestión 
de esta Administración. 
Palabras clave: Agencia Tributaria, eficiencia técnica, análisis envol-
vente de datos, recaudación tributaria.
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Eficiência	relativa	numa	administração	tributária:	 
efeitos de uma melhoria em seus resultados
RESUMO
Neste trabalho, aborda-se a análise da administração tributária espanhola 
mediante a avaliação da eficiência relativa de cada um dos escritórios terri-
toriais que a integram, empregando, para isso, a análise envolvente de dados 
de forma bietápica, com uma orientação output. Neste estudo, analisaram-se 
47 escritórios territoriais considerando três inputs: 1) os gastos correntes em 
bens e serviços; 2) o número de declarações gerenciadas pelos dois principais 
impostos diretos e 3) o número de efetivos que presta seus serviços. Como 
output, os Ingressos por Atos de Liquidação. A análise demonstra que uma 
atuação eficiente dos escritórios territoriais poderia ter aumentado em 21,6% 
os resultados da gestão dessa Administração.
Palavras-chave: Agência Tributária, análise envolvente de dados, 
arrecadação tributária, eficiência técnica.
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INTRODUCTION
The results presented by the body charged with 
overseeing the tax system are essential to the 
fulfilment of the objectives established by any go-
vernment. Therein resides the source of revenue, 
in the form of taxation that allows to meet any 
expenditure incurred. When this body proves to be 
ineffective, it can compromise fiscal policy (Faría 
& Yucelik, 1995), since it has direct bearing on the 
tax system’s efficiency and, therefore, on its capa-
city to produce revenue resulting from collection 
(Rubio, 2010). 
The success of any tax system is depen-
dent upon the administration charged with its 
implementation (Lasheras & Herrera, 1991). 
Governments have opted for the introduction of 
new taxes and for an increase in tax rates in scena-
rios where such an action may have proved unne-
cessary, had greater efforts been made to ensure 
an optimal organization within the management 
of the tax system.
Therefore, a tax system should not be con-
sidered solely in terms of taxation structure or 
the quantification of taxable events, but it must 
also be approached from the perspective of the 
efficiency and efficacy of the tax administration 
charged with overseeing it. The tendency towards 
offsetting deficit by incrementing fiscal pressure 
might be substituted by a more rigorous control 
of the management of the tax system, increasing 
its efficiency, while reducing the incidence of fraud 
(Rubio, 1996; Ruibal, 2008).
Over the course of the last decade, the 
organization of the functions of the public sec-
tor has undergone considerable changes (OECD, 
2008). The tax administration, swept along by this 
reformist tendency, created quasi-autonomous 
bodies to achieve certain improvements in terms 
of collection, the provision of services or self-
financing. Such structural modifications gave 
rise to various forms of carrying out the task of 
overseeing taxation. More specifically, four cate-
gories of organization can be established: a) a 
single directorate within the framework of the 
Ministry of Finance or a corresponding Ministry; b) 
several directorates within the framework of the 
Ministry of Finance or a corresponding Ministry; 
c) a unified quasi-autonomous body that is a 
dependency of a Ministry; and d) a unified quasi-
autonomous body overseen by a governing board. 
Table 1.
Tax institutions 
Single directorate within 
the framework of the MOF
Several directorates within 
the framework of the MOF Quasi-autonomous body
Quasi-autonomous body 
featuring a governing 
board
• Belgium
• Denmark
• Estonia
• France
• Netherlands
• Czech Republic
• Switzerland
• Germany
• Austria
• Chile
• Cyprus
• Greece
• Italy
• Luxembourg
• Malta
• Poland
• Portugal
• Australia
• Korea
• Slovenia
• Spain
• Finland
• Hungary
• Ireland
• Iceland
• Japan
• Latvia
• Malaysia
• Norway
• New Zealand
• Slovakia
• Romania
• South Africa
• Sweden
• Argentina
• Bulgaria
• Canada
• USA
• Mexico
• United Kingdom
• Singapore
Source: Authors’ elaboration. Data obtained from OECD 2007.
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Table 1 evidences the predominance of unified 
quasi-autonomous bodies within the OECD cou-
ntries and additional countries that were studied. 
Attention should be drawn to the fact that appro-
ximately 50% of the OECD member countries have 
created quasi-autonomous bodies. 
Since 1992, the Spanish State has boasted its 
own specific quasi-autonomous body, distinguished 
from the rest of the General State Administration: 
the State Agency for Tax Administration (AEAT by 
its acronym in Spanish or Tax Agency), charged 
with the integrated management of the state tax 
and customs system, a task that entails a wide 
range of activities and functions. The Agency ma-
nifests itself as a body charged exclusively with 
the management of the tax system in its entirety, 
while it lacks any power in terms of its design 
(Gaitero, 1993). Forming part of the Central Public 
Administration, AEAT, nevertheless, exists as a legal 
entity in its own right and boasts a certain degree 
of autonomy in terms of budgetary matters and 
personnel expenditure, thereby allowing to classify 
it as a quasi-autonomous body that is a dependen-
cy of a Ministry, as outlined above.2
Given the importance and singularity of the 
functions assigned to the Agency, the legislature 
saw the need to devise a specific legal status, ai-
ming to promote greater agility and operational 
efficiency. The Agency model is well established and 
the evolution of the Spanish tax administration has 
sought to achieve greater integration between the 
strategies of international and national tax admi-
nistrations with the maximum amount of shared 
information, as well as to especially strengthen 
preventive actions (Catalan, 2014). Thus, it is cons-
tituted as a body governed by public law that is a 
2 However, this interpretation is not without detractors, as 
the legal standing of AEAT has often been the subject of 
debate (Sánchez Galiana, 1995), to the extent of denying 
it a place among public administrations. As Márquez notes 
(1994: 14), “Tax Agency is not State,” whereby “it does not 
form a part of the Tax Administration.” Ferreiro (1991: 401) 
maintains that “it is technically an autonomous body, which 
is nevertheless subjected to designs to exclude it from the 
regulations applicable to such bodies.” There are those 
who suggest that the body’s inception represents a move 
towards decentralization and privatization (Garrido, 1991).
dependency of the Ministry of Finance and Public 
Administrations, through the State Secretariat for 
Finance (Figure 1). 
Figure 1.
Institutional Hierarchy
Ministry of Finance and Public 
Administrations
State Secretariat for Finance
State Agency for Tax 
Administration 
Source: Authors.
Within the AEAT’s sphere of operation, a 
distinction must be made regarding whether its 
actions have a centralized or a peripheral focus. 
Central AEAT services are essentially based on 
an organizational model ordered into operative 
functional areas, devised around six departments: 
tax management, financial and tax inspection, 
tax collection, customs and excise, IT department 
and the department of human resources, com-
plemented by several support structures, such as 
legal service, financial management service, fiscal 
and statistical studies service, and planning and 
institutional relations service.
The peripheral or territorial services are made 
up by 17 special regional offices, one in every 
Autonomous Community, 52 provincial offices,3 
which are the focus of this paper, incorporating 
3 The current Spanish Constitution of 1978 addresses the 
division of the State into provinces, stating that [the State] 
“will be organised, territorially, into municipalities, provinces 
and into the Autonomous Communities [Autonomous Re-
gions] that might be established. All of these entities are 
afforded autonomy for the management of their respective 
interests.” Spain consists of a total of 50 provinces, along 
with the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla. 
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239 local tax authorities, found in a number of 
municipalities, 36 of which are customs offices. 
The peripheral structure is illustrated in Figure 2.
Review of the empirical literature
The study of efficiency within the public sec-
tor is a controversial subject, given the difficulty of 
measurements and the multitude and heterogenei-
ty of its constituent sectors: justice, health, citizen 
security, education, tax administration, among 
others. Nevertheless, analysis of the efficiency 
of tax administration, in spite of the difficulty it 
presents, proves necessary in order to reinforce a 
sense of fiscal commitment among citizens. This is 
due to the fact that efficient management on the 
part of tax administration legitimises its activity, 
promoting voluntary compliance among taxpayers 
and encouraging them to continue financing the 
public sector with confidence via revenue resulting 
from taxation (Gale & Holtzblatt, 2000).
The need to determine and measure the 
efficiency of the body charged with overseeing 
the Spanish tax system has led us to undertake 
the analysis of AEAT. This paper seeks to provide 
an approximate value for the relative efficiency of 
the regional offices that make up the tax adminis-
tration system, employing a series of variables that 
are considered essential to its correct operation. 
While the efficiency of tax administration is one of 
the maxims put forward by Adam Smith (1776) in 
his famous work addressing taxation, research on 
efficiency within tax offices remains relatively scant, 
due to the difficulty of accessing data, the limited 
amount of data available, and the confidentiality of 
such data in the majority of countries (Barros, 2007; 
Hasseldine, 2010; Onrubia, 2010; Førsund et al., 
2015). This prevents us from determining whether 
tax administration achieves universal compliance 
with the tax system, or whether, on the contrary, it 
warrants certain reforms.
To put it into context, a literature review on 
the analysis of efficiency and productivity within tax 
offices reveals that the published studies employ 
frontier techniques: stochastic frontier analysis and, 
primarily, data envelopment analysis (hereinafter 
DEA). Table 2 indicates the references and the most 
important characteristics of the empirical studies on 
efficiency within tax administrations.
Thus, productive efficiency in the larger 
Indian states was analysed over the period between 
1980 and 1993 via stochastic frontier analysis (Jha 
et al. 1999), data envelopment analysis and the 
Malmquist Index (Thirtle et al., 2000). The work 
carried out by Moesen and Persoon (2002) analyses 
efficiency in 289 Belgian tax offices in 1991 using 
Figure 2.
Peripheral structure of the offices that form AEAT 
Special RegionalOffices
(One per region or Autonomous Community, 17)
Provincial Offices
(One per province, along with the autonomous cities, 52)
Local Tax Authorities
(Found in certain municipalities, 239)
Source: Authors.
140
Finanz. polit. econ., ISSN 2248-6046, Vol. 9, No. 1, enero-junio, 2017, pp. 135-149
Elena Villar Rubio • Pedro Enrique Barrilao González • Juan Delgado Alaminos
Free Disposal Hull and DEA. In the case of tax offices 
in Portugal, Barros (2005) employed a stochastic 
evolution model combined with a DEA approach, 
while Barros (2007) evaluates the technical and 
allocative efficiency of the same offices over the 
1999-2002 period. Similarly, Førsund et al. (2005) 
apply DEA and the Malmquist Productivity Index to 
the analysis of tax offices in Norway between 2002 
and 2004. In turn, Lewis (2006) studies inefficien-
cy in 224 local tax offices in Indonesia employing 
stochastic frontier analysis with a cost frontier ap-
proach. More recently, Katsahari (2010) uses DEA 
to estimate efficiency in tax offices in Greece from 
2001 to 2006, with the aim of determining those 
that maximized tax collection levels. Ruy and Lee 
(2013) use DEA to estimate the aggregate efficiency 
scores of six tax jurisdictions in Korea for each of 
the 14 years between 1998 and 2011. And, final-
ly, Alm and Duncan (2014) use data provided by 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development for the period 2007-2011, together 
with a novel three-step estimation strategy that 
utilizes DEA and SFA in order to determine the rela-
tive efficiency of tax agencies in their use of inputs.
In Spain, attention should be drawn to the 
work of González and Miles (2000), who analyse 
the efficiency of 15 regional Spanish tax offices in 
1995 via DEA, employing a bootstrap technique. 
For their part, the study by Esteller (2003) meas-
ures and explains the level of technical efficiency 
in the administration of taxes collected from the 
Autonomous Communities in 1992 and between 
1995 and 1998, via the estimation of the stochastic 
frontier.
ESTIMATING EFFICIENCY WITHIN THE 
PROVINCIAL OFFICES OF THE AEAT IN 
SPAIN
Methodology
There are three main types of efficiency (Farrell, 
1957): technical efficiency, which consists of 
maximizing results with a determined amount of 
resources; price or allocative efficiency, based on 
maximizing results within the context of certain 
fixed expenditure levels or a set price for resou-
rces; and global (or economic) efficiency, which 
reflects the production of goods and services that 
afford the greatest benefits to society at the lowest 
Table 2.
Empirical analysis of efficiency within tax administrations
Reference Country Sample years Sample units Methodological approach1
Jha et al. (1999) India 1980-1993 15 states SFA
González and Miles (2000) Spain 1995 15 inspection tax offices DEA, BA
Thirtle et al. (2000) India 1980-1993 15 states DEA, MI
Moesen and Persoon (2002) Belgium 1991 289 regional tax offices DEA, FDH
Esteller (2003) Spain 1992 and 1995-1998 45 provincial tax offices SFA
Barros (2005) Portugal 1999-2002 41 tax offices SFA
Førsund et al. (2005) Norway 2002-2004 98 tax offices DEA, MI
Lewis (2006) Indonesia 2003 224 local tax offices SFA
Barros (2007) Portugal 1999-2002 41 tax offices DEA, 2nd
Katharaki and Tsakas (2010) Greece 2001-2006 27 tax offices DEA, WA, 2nd
Ruy and Lee (2013) Korea 1998-2011 6 tax offices DEA
Alm and Duncan (2014) OECD 2007-2011 28 national tax offices DEA, SFA
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on the literature reviewed.
Notes: 1 BA: bootstrap analysis; DEA: data envelopment analysis; FDH: Free Disposal Hull; MI: Malmquist Index; SFA: stochastic 
frontier analysis; WA: window analysis; 2nd: second stage analysis.
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possible social cost. This paper is concerned with 
the concept of technical efficiency, given that 
analysing other types of efficiency entails the need 
for awareness of market prices or, where necessary, 
social costs, values that remain largely unknown in 
the case of the public sector.
The existing techniques to measure efficien-
cy within the public sector can be grouped into 
various types. A distinction can be made between 
parametric and non-parametric methods, while 
statistical methods can be employed or rejected 
when estimating the frontier that, ultimately, may 
be specified as stochastic (random) or determinis-
tic. This paper employs DEA methodology, based 
on the article by Charnes et al. (1978), set up as a 
non-parametric, deterministic approach that allows 
us to obtain a measurement of relative efficiency 
between regional offices, understood as decision-
making units (DMUs), in order to identify those 
that present optimal performance when compared 
with the rest.
This methodology entails priorities that make 
it particularly suitable for the measurement of 
efficiency within the public sector, in which sense 
attention might be drawn to the following:4 it does 
not make assumptions about the functional form 
in the production function; the model accounts for 
inputs and outputs of a multi-dimensional nature; 
it is a flexible model that places few restrictions 
when defining production as a whole and its co-
rresponding frontier. 
In view of the peculiarities of the AEAT pro-
duction process, an output-oriented two-stage 
DEA methodology was considered appropriate, in 
keeping with the BCC model (Banker et al., 1984), 
as we believe that priority is placed within the AEAT 
management on the objective of concerting efforts 
to achieve the greatest possible output with the 
inputs in question, leaving little room for manoeu-
vres in terms of adjusting inputs.
4 Further details on DEA might be found in Cooper et al. 
(2007).
The two-stage method involves problem 
solving within each unit. In the first stage, the 
objective is to determine the greatest proportional 
increase that would be needed within the outputs 
in order to generate a situation where each DMU 
under study achieved the efficiency of the Farrell-
Debreu measure, or weak-form efficiency. In the 
second stage, based on the optimum obtained in 
the first stage, outputs are adjusted and surplus 
variables maximized in order to radially shift the 
projected point in the first stage, which complies 
with Farrell’s efficiency measures (1957), to a 
point regarding efficient envelopment where it 
complies with the Pareto-Koopmans optimal va-
lue, or strong-form efficiency. Thus, the maximum 
possible increase to outputs within a DMU can be 
calculated as the sum of a radial component and 
the corresponding surplus variable. 
Data and variables
Data corresponding to 2012 were analysed, since 
it was the most recent year with available data 
when writing this paper, due to the backlog (the-
re is normally a lag of three or four years) in the 
publication of data on the part of the Ministry of 
Finance and Public Administrations.
Of the 52 existing provincial offices, 47 
were taken into consideration for the purposes 
of this paper, excluding the offices in the pro-
vinces of Madrid, Navarre, Alava, Gipuzkoa and 
Biscay. Madrid was excluded because it houses 
the Central Directorate for Major Taxpayers,5 
while in the remaining cases exclusion is justified 
by the fact that they are provinces that lie within 
Autonomous Communities with different economic 
systems,6 hence their data are not homogeneous 
5 From 2006 onwards, the Central Directorate for Major 
Taxpayers has been established as a body with powers 
throughout the national territory, focusing on the coordi-
nated control of major taxpayers and the improvement of 
attention and service afforded to them.
6 The Autonomous Community of Navarre (formed by a single 
province: Navarre) and the Basque Country (formed by the 
provinces of Alava, Gipuzkoa and Biscay) are Autonomous 
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and therefore not subject to extrapolation to the 
remaining offices. Indeed, their inclusion would 
have undermined the coherence of the results to 
a considerable extent.7 
The selection of inputs and outputs is of 
vital importance and, in many occasions, highly 
complex, given that it requires the prior clarifica-
tion of the objectives established by each DMU, 
which gives rise to the need to select the inputs 
and outputs that best represent the activity to be 
studied. In this case, three inputs were taken into 
consideration: 1) current expenditure in goods 
and services (EXPEN), addressed in chapter II of 
the AEAT expenditure budget and required for 
the effective application of the tax system; 2) the 
number of tax returns (TAX_RET) processed in each 
one of the offices, identifying a return per taxpayer 
and tax;8 and, 3) personnel numbers (STAFF) in the 
employ of each one of the offices under analysis, 
taking in both contractual staff and civil servants. 
A number of these inputs have also been 
selected by other authors when analysing efficiency 
within their respective tax administrations: Barros 
(2007), Esteller (2003), Hunter and Nelson (1996), 
Katharaki and Tsakas (2010), Maekawa and Atoda 
(2001), and Moesen and Persoon (2002) included 
both the EXPEN and STAFF inputs, while all included 
the STAFF input.
The main contribution of this paper consists 
of the analysis of an output that, up to this point, 
has not been employed: revenue resulting from 
tax assessments (hereafter IAL9) was considered 
as output, representing the revenue collected by 
various offices as a result of the effective applica-
tion of available resources, employing all coercive 
measures at their disposal. Previous studies have 
employed other concepts of tax collection (Barros, 
Communities of chartered regime and operate a special 
system within the Spanish State.
7 These offices are also excluded from the sample in the case 
of González and Miles (2000).
8 The number of returns makes reference to the returns re-
sulting from taxes that generate the greatest deal of activity 
within the AEAT: Personal Income Tax and Company Tax.
9 IAL: Ingresos por actos de liquidación.
2005; Esteller, 2003; Hyun et al., 2001; Jha & Sahni, 
1997; Jha et al., 1999; Katharaki & Tsakas, 2010; 
Maekawa & Atoda, 2001; Thirtle, 2000), which, in 
the case of Spain, might be comparable to the Tax 
Revenue Allocated to the Budget (ITAPE10), repre-
senting revenue obtained automatically, without 
direct action regarding the resources employed 
by each office, in the form of self-assessed tax 
contributions in most instances.
This paper also takes into account variances 
in fiscal capacity between offices, which conditions 
the output obtained in each case (Esteller, 2003), 
to which end the output was weighted by the GDP 
per capita (hereinafter GDPpc) of the respective 
province in relation to average GDPpc at national 
level. Thus, two models are presented: in the first 
model the output (IAL) is calculated without GDP 
weighting, and in the second, the output (IALc) is 
adjusted in accordance with GDP.  
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                          𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 × 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼                                                   [1] The ratio is lower than 1 when GDPpc is higher than the national average, and greater 
than 1 when the contrary is true. The descriptive statistics of the inputs and outputs 
employed are detailed in Table 3.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics of the sample
 
Average Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Inputs
EXPEN* 1,198.99 2,366.15 98 17,626
TAX_RET** 363,902.11 418,422.50 32,992 2,650,235
STAFF** 439.80 576.11 50 4,010
Output
IAL (model 1)* 71,112.13 119,995.29 3,711 898,233                                                             
10 The number of returns makes reference to the returns resulting from taxes that generate the greatest deal 
of activity within the AEAT: Personal Income Tax and Company Tax.
11 IAL: Ingresos por actos de liquidación.
12 ITAPE: Ingresos tributarios afectos al presupuesto. 
[1] 
The ratio is lower t an 1 w e  GDPpc is 
higher than the national average, and greater 
than 1 when the contrary is true. The descriptive 
statistics of the inputs and outputs employed are 
detailed in Table 3.
RESULTS
First, in order to analyse the correlation between 
model 1, which considers output without adjus-
ting for GDP, and model 2, which oes adjust IAL 
in accordance with GDP, the Spearman test was 
employed (Table 4).
The results indicate a high correlation bet-
ween the two models, whereby the adjustment 
of the output in model 2 (IALc) offsets variances 
in fiscal capacity among the 47 offices analysed, 
although their ranking varies little in accordance 
with the degree of relative efficiency achieved. 
Comparing the efficiency ranking obtained for 
10 ITAPE: Ingresos tributarios afectos al presupuesto.
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the DMUs analysed in each model, the office that 
undergo the greatest change in ranked position 
is Zaragoza (with a fall of 13 positions, although 
it remains efficient irrespective of the model em-
ployed). This drop in ranked position is justified 
because Zaragoza is a province that presents a 
GDPpc that is higher than the national GDPpc, 
positioned as the 6th province ranked according to 
the highest GDPpc, thus weighting the output by 
GDP gives rise to this descent within the rankings.
Table 4.
Results of the Spearman correlation test
Spearman’s rho 0.8029
p-value 0.0000
N 47
At the opposite end, attention should be 
drawn to Cáceres y Badajoz (both offices are 
located within the Autonomous Community of 
Extremadura), as the provinces that undergo the 
greatest change within the rankings in terms of 
ascending, improving their positions by 42 and 
18 places, respectively (although Badajoz remains 
inefficient irrespective of the model employed; 
Cáceres, however, becomes efficient by applying 
model 2). In contrast to the previous case, this 
improvement is justified by the fact that Cáceres 
and Badajoz present a GDPpc that is lower than 
the average. More specifically, Cáceres has the 
lowest GDPpc of the 47 provinces studied, while 
Badajoz occupies the 45th position, which justifies 
their somewhat dramatic rise through the rankings 
when output is weighted by GDP.
As indicated above, DEA analysis allows us 
to determine the most efficient office compared 
to the other offices under study. The best practice 
observed is then employed to evaluate all the other 
practices, which explains the reference to relative 
efficiency (Charnes et al., 1981). On the other 
hand, an inefficient office proves to be inefficient 
precisely because there exists another or a linear 
combination of other offices that can produce the 
same output while expending fewer inputs, thus 
the former is forced to emulate the performance 
of the latter.
Applying the BCC model to the variables 
under study we obtain descriptive statistics derived 
from the efficiency analysis for the two models em-
ployed (Table 5). Determining an average efficiency 
value of 1.520 for model 2 indicates that, in most 
cases, the offices could improve revenue resulting 
from tax assessments by 52%, evidencing clear 
room for improvement.
Variance in the efficiency of units that de-
pends on the model affects a limited number of 
provinces: it is the case of Cáceres, Jaén, Granada, 
Huelva, Cuenca, Zamora, Soria, and Almería. They 
Table 3.
Descriptive statistics of the sample
 Average Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Inputs
EXPEN* 1,198.99 2,366.15 98 17,626
TAX_RET** 363,902.11 418,422.50 32,992 2,650,235
STAFF** 439.80 576.11 50 4,010
Output
IAL (model 1)* 71,112.13 119,995.29 3,711 898,233
IALc (model 2)* 76,089.97 106,795.81 4,156 763,498
Notes: 
*The “EXPEND” input and the output for model 1 and 2, “IAL” and “IALc” are expressed in thousands of euros.
** The remaining inputs are expressed in units.
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become efficient when the economic dynamism of 
the respective province is taken into consideration, 
which is an entirely coherent result given that the 
provinces present GDPpc levels that are below ave-
rage, thus they move from inefficient to efficient 
once output is weighted by GDP.
Table 5.
Descriptive statistics of efficiency results
 
Average 
efficiency
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum
Model 1 1.447 0.440 1 2.478
Model 2 1.520 0.409 1 2.382
From this point, considering only the analysis 
where the output was adjusted by GDP (model 2), 
as it is thought to provide a more faithful reflec-
tion of the true dimension of the output analysed, 
we obtain the efficiency results indicated in the 
appendix for each of the 47 offices under study. 
Of the 47 offices analysed, 21 were identified as 
efficient in terms of the Farrell-Debreu definition, 
or evidencing weak-form efficiency (Table 6), given 
that their efficiency results were equal to one; mo-
reover, as they all presented surplus variable of zero 
value, they proved to be efficient in accordance 
with the Pareto-Koopmans definition, that is to 
say, evidencing strong-form efficiency. 
Once determined which offices are effi-
cient, it is possible to rank them according to the 
frequency with which these offices appear as a 
reference point for inefficient offices (Table 6). For 
each inefficient office, DEA allows us to determine 
a series of contrastingly efficient offices, which 
thereby form a reference group, the so-called 
peers, which means that they provide a reference 
point for improvement for the inefficient units. As 
Table 6 demonstrates, there are three offices that 
present clearly higher efficiency levels within the 
group of efficient DMUs: Córdoba, Barcelona, and 
Castellón, ordered from higher to lower frequency, 
providing reference point for inefficient offices on 
18, 17, and 10 occasions, respectively.
Table 6.
Frequency and weights of efficient DMUs (model 2)
Efficient office Frequency Weights
Córdoba 18 5.31
Barcelona 17 3.05
Castellón 10 1.28
Málaga 8 1.39
Ceuta 7 0.40
Lleida 6 0.22
Huelva 5 0.40
Ávila 5 0.28
Valladolid 3 0.29
Cáceres 2 0.72
Segovia 1 0.75
Soria 1 0.59
Toledo 1 0.37
Jaén 1 0.12
Almería 0 0
Granada 0 0
Melilla 0 0
Teruel 0 0
Zaragoza 0 0
Cuenca 0 0
Zamora 0 0
The provincial office of Córdoba can be con-
sidered as the global leader, a term introduced by 
Oral and Yolalan (1990) to draw attention to the 
unit within the sample that can be considered as 
presenting the best overall performance. As El-
Mahgary and Lahdelma (1995) and Avkiran (1999) 
point out, the global leader is the efficient unit 
that appears with the highest frequency within the 
reference groups for inefficient units. The office of 
Barcelona appears at a frequency of 17 occasions, 
while the provincial office of Castellón appears as 
reference point on 10 occasions. The following 11 
provinces appear at a frequency of 1 to 8 occasions, 
which calls into question their status as a model. 
In the case of the last seven provinces, though 
qualified as efficient, they never serve as reference 
145
RELATIVE EFFICIENCY WITHIN A TAX ADMINISTRATION: THE EFFECTS OF RESULT IMPROVEMENT
point for any other office, which suggests that “ei-
ther the efficient unit in question is only efficient 
within a very limited sector, due to a high degree 
of specialisation, or it possesses an Input/Output 
relationship that is highly unusual” (El- Mahgary 
& Lahdelma, 1995: 706).
In parallel, we analysed the weights of each 
of the reference units (benchmark), determining 
the extent to which each benchmark within the 
reference group for an inefficient unit contributes 
towards the target values of this unit (Table 6), 
thereby providing a more faithful representation of 
the true intensity with which each benchmark inter-
venes in the construction of the corresponding inef-
ficient units. The results of the analysis of weights 
demonstrate that Córdoba is the office with the 
greatest weight (5.31) as a reference point for 
other units, followed by Barcelona, with a weight 
of 3.05; in the third and fourth position, there are 
the provincial offices of Málaga and Castellón, 
with weights of 1.39 and 1.28, respectively. The 
remaining offices present residual weights. 
Once the estimates of technical efficiency are 
obtained for the 47 offices under study, it is equally 
important to determine those offices that stand out 
for the opposite reason, that is to say, those offices 
that present the greatest degree of inefficiency. In 
this case, as the appendix shows, the provincial 
offices of Asturias, Lugo, Cantabria, Las Palmas, 
Palencia, Murcia, and La Rioja are those that prove 
to be the most inefficient when compared with 
their peers. It should be pointed out that four of 
these offices (Asturias, Cantabria, Murcia, and La 
Rioja) are located within Autonomous Communities 
with only one province, hence such offices are the 
most susceptible to improvement as a result of 
changes in the management.
 The second step, representing an important 
contribution of the present analysis, is to deter-
mine, via the surplus values obtained in the second 
stage, the possible increase in revenue resulting 
from tax assessments, if the offices in question 
display efficient behaviour. In this case, IAL might 
have risen by 21.6%; that is, if all of the DMUs 
had acted efficiently, this would have represented 
a rise of 1023 million euros in the average annual 
IAL over the 47 offices analysed.
The efficient action of a tax administration 
does not only directly cause an increase in collec-
tion, but it also gives rise to a reduction in tax fraud, 
given a greater degree of voluntary compliance 
among taxpayers, who perceive a more efficient 
administration that pursues undeclared taxable 
events. Thus, in addition to increasing revenue 
resulting from tax assessments, an even greater 
increase could be observed in terms of voluntary 
contribution, in addition to its beneficial effects to 
any society that observes compliance with tax re-
gulations, irrespective of the origin of the taxpayer.
CONCLUSIONS
Tax systems should not be considered solely in 
terms of taxation structure or the quantification of 
taxable events, but they must also be approached 
from the perspective of the efficiency and efficacy 
of the tax administration charged with overseeing 
it, as a means of obtaining higher revenue resulting 
from taxation and a lower instance of fiscal fraud.
This paper presents an analysis of relati-
ve efficiency among 47 territorial offices that 
form part of the Spanish State Agency for Tax 
Administration. This study was motivated by the 
present need to achieve higher volumes of collec-
tion via tax administrations, given the current high 
levels of public deficit. Our research indicates that 
improved efficiency within the offices that make 
up the body charged with managing taxes in Spain 
(AEAT) would entail an increase of 1023 million 
euros in revenue resulting from tax assessments 
(output), which would mean a rise by 21.6% in 
collection. This could offset the intensity of a co-
llection policy focused on the introduction of new 
taxes and an increase in tax rates, or imply fewer 
cutbacks in public expenditure, with the ensuing 
political and social cost that this implies.
Based on the output-oriented two-stage 
data envelopment analysis carried out, attention 
should be drawn to the fact that among the 
47 offices under study, only 21 were identified 
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as technically efficient. On average, taking into ac-
count the output weighted by the GDP per capita 
of the corresponding province in relation to the 
national average GDP per capita, it is found that 
the offices could have increased revenue resulting 
from tax assessments by 52%, which corroborates 
the premise that there is a great deal of scope for 
improvement, acting on those offices that prove 
to be inefficient in relation to those offices that 
present optimal behaviour.
Among the offices that proved to be effi-
cient, the provincial office of Córdoba must be 
highlighted as the global leader, representing 
the reference point for the greatest number of 
inefficient offices; moreover, if we take into con-
sideration weights, understood as the intensity 
with which each efficient office intervenes in the 
construction of an inefficient office, Córdoba ap-
pears first in this sense too. At the other end of the 
scale, among the values calculated for technical 
efficiency throughout the entire body of offices 
that were studied, Asturias, Lugo, Cantabria, Las 
Palmas, Palencia, Murcia, and La Rioja bear parti-
cular mention as the least efficient. 
Finally, it is important to point out the diffi-
culty entailed when attempting to gather infor-
mation, along with the time lag that affects the 
publication of the limited data provided by the 
Ministry of Finance and Public Administrations. It 
is precisely this lack of information that prevents 
a more detailed analysis, such as the analysis of 
more precise data provided by provincial offices, 
subordinated offices and local tax authorities that 
might enable us to register more than two hundred 
observations. Regarding the methodology emplo-
yed, in addition to being particularly widespread in 
this type of research, we believe that it is a highly 
useful tool that enables us to drawn important 
conclusions with regards to public and fiscal policy.
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APPENDIX
Table A1. 
Technical efficiency of the entire sample (model 2)
Dmu Name Efficiency Dmu Name Efficiency
Córdoba 1 Guadalajara 1.225
Barcelona 1 Cádiz 1.240
Castellón 1 A Coruña 1.246
Málaga 1 Leon 1.267
Ceuta 1 Badajoz 1.300
Lleida 1 Albacete 1.309
Huelva 1 Alicante 1.369
Avila 1 Salamanca 1.383
Valladolid 1 Tarragona 1.393
Cáceres 1 Girona 1.413
Segovia 1 Tenerife 1.416
Soria 1 Burgos 1.455
Toledo 1       Baleares 1.507
Jaén 1 Ciudad Real 1.533
Almería 1 Ourense 1.575
Granada 1 Pontevedra 1.957
Melilla 1 La Rioja 1.958
Teruel 1 Murcia 1.992
Zaragoza 1 Palencia 2.044
Cuenca 1 Las Palmas 2.063
Zamora 1 Cantabria 2.125
Valencia 1.109 Lugo 2.243
Sevilla 1.145 Asturias 2.381
Huesca 1.153   
